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ABSTRACT
Most studies of tobacco control policy focus on the central level of national
governments. Yet within the European Union, three levels of government
have responsibilities for tobacco control: the EU; the central governments
of member states; and provinces or devolved levels of government. This
article examines the role of each in the formation of tobacco policy in the
United Kingdom. It compares the theory of regulatory federalism with
multilevel governance as explanations for tobacco regulatory policy within
the EU. While executive-legislative fusion in the United Kingdom leads
to the practice of discretionary federalism, the EU provides mixed support
for the theory of regulatory federalism. There is significant policy innova-
tion in the UK and its devolved territories as well as limited policy authority
for tobacco control in the EU. Overall, multi-level governance (MLG) may
be a superior, albeit incomplete, explanation of tobacco control within the
EU and the UK.
Introduction
Tobacco control has evolved from a domestic to an international issue
with regulatory measures championed by intergovernmental organiza-
tions. The World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control in  to promote global tobacco
control, while the World Bank will not support any activity that leads to
the promotion of tobacco production or consumption (Asare ).
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Lower-level jurisdictions have also taken action. In some cases, provinces
have adopted earlier and stronger tobacco control policies than the
central government. This trend is strong in federal and quasi-federal
jurisdictions (Studlar ; ; Cairney a; b; ; Asare
). Smoking prevalence has fallen significantly since the early post-
World War II period, and government policy in most advanced democ-
racies reflects and reinforces the ‘denormalisation’ of smoking (Studlar
: ). Both the nature of government and tobacco policy have changed
significantly.
Within the European Union (EU), three levels of government have
responsibilities for tobacco control: () the EU itself; () the central
governments of member states; and () in federal or quasi-federal systems,
the provinces or devolved level of government. This article examines the
role of each in the formation of tobacco policy in the past twenty years,
focusing particularly on the United Kingdom (UK) since . The most
comprehensive benchmarking study indicates that the UK leads the rest
of Europe on tobacco control (Joossens and Raw ). The UK is an
ideal case study because policy is at an advanced stage, and the policy
responsibility of each level of government is well established. Further-
more, constitutional developments in the UK since  allow useful
comparisons to be made with federal systems. The UK is often described
as a ‘quasi-federal’ polity (Bogdanor ) to reflect the powers that
devolved governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland enjoy in
practice (the most populous jurisdiction, England, remains under central
government control).
There are two main ways to examine the consequences of these
developments (Cairney ). The first focuses on federalism and
intergovernmental relations (IGR), examining the separation of powers
between jurisdictions, the interaction between levels of government, and
recourses to formal dispute resolution. The second, derived from the
study of ‘multi-level governance’ (MLG), examines informal relationships
and the blurring of boundaries between public/private action and levels
of governmental sovereignty. When studying tobacco policy in the EU,
the advantage of MLG is that it was developed to address the idiosyn-
crasies of EU policy. A study of tobacco policy would be a unique
addition to the policy-specific case study literature (see Bache and
Flinders ). The advantage of federalism studies is that, if we can
demonstrate their applicability to the EU, the results can supplement the
more established literature and make our findings comparable with
political systems such as the US.
Our strategy is to employ both approaches while being aware of their
differences and limitations. For federalism, we outline Kelemen’s ()
study and explore its relevance to tobacco policy in the EU and UK.
 Asare, Cairney and Studlar
Keleman’s theory produces a very clear prediction: the structure and
power relations of EU institutions produces a relatively top-down
process, in which policy is passed at the top and its implementation is
regulated at the bottom. We contrast this approach to MLG (Hooghe
and Marks, ), which suggests that outcomes can not be deductively
derived from structured institutional relationships. Rather, they follow an
often indeterminate process of negotiation and exchange between levels
of government and non-governmental actors, and the policy process is
often bottom-up as well as top-down.
Federalism in the EU and UK
Federal relationships within both the EU and UK allow us to compare
their patterns of behaviour. Kelemen’s () theory of EU policy
contrasts regulatory federalism with the two classic perspectives, neo-
functionalism (supranationalism) and intergovernmentalism. Kelemen’s
argument is two-fold. First, the vertical relationship (or the ‘politics of
competence’) is similar in most federal systems: policymaking takes place
at the federal (or central) level, while the responsibility for most
implementation rests with the states (or sub-central authorities). Second,
the extent to which the centre allows sub-central authorities the freedom
to implement federal policy (the ‘politics of discretion’) depends on the
levels of horizontal fragmentation within the central government.
A highly fragmented system ‘encourages an adversarial, litigious
approach’ (: ). The competition between institutions makes them
more protective of their authority and more likely to write detailed laws
for the provinces to follow (‘regulatory federalism’). In contrast, a
concentration of power at the centre encourages ‘discretionary federal-
ism’ or a ‘less judicialised’ approach (: ). Written laws are broad,
allowing flexibility in application by lower-level jurisdictions. Thus,
the policymaking process is centralized in federal systems while the
implementation process varies, depending on the separation of, and
competition among, institutions.
Kelemen tests this explanation successfully for environmental policy.
The US and EU are examples of regulatory federalism while Australia
and Canada, with Westminster parliamentary systems and weak
bicameralism, operate under discretionary federalism. Germany, with
relatively strong central-level bicameralism and one legislative chamber
representing the provinces, has moved toward regulatory federalism
because of pressure from its membership of the EU (Kelemen, : ).
Yet Kelemen’s (: ) summary table suggests that the EU may be
more similar to Germany’s medium position on regulatory federalism,
with the US still clearly the leader in this respect. We examine whether
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Kelemen’s theory applies to the EU and UK on tobacco regulation. Not
only do we explore a different policy area but also a quasi-federal state,
the UK, not included in Kelemen’s discussion.
Numerous studies have concluded that the EU is a federation or
quasi-federation (Sbragia ; Leibfried and Pierson ; Cowles et al.
; McKay ; Asare ). However, the key feature of Kelemen’s
analysis is that it shifts our focus from political structures and federal
status to the behaviour of institutions which operate in a federal-like way
according to the levels of horizontal fragmentation at the centre. The
EU’s primary focus is regulation and it operates as a federal system
(Kelemen : ). Therefore, it can be compared to other federal
polities, particularly since EU policy adoption occurs at the central level,
with member states responsible for implementation.
Kelemen’s theory can be situated in a literature that is still uncertain
about the mix of EU and member state influence. For example, Leibfried
and Pierson (), Sbragia () and Castles () argue that the EU
has created conditions that undermine the individual social and labour
market protection policies of member states. Castles () links the
growing role of the EU in domestic affairs to the emergence of an
integrated market and the rapid steps towards monetary union. The
authority at the disposal of the EU implies that a number of policies of
member states have become standardized, and genuine European social
and market policies are in the process of emerging. Equally, Kurzer
() stresses that member states are converging even in their morality
policies such as drugs, alcohol, and abortion.
Yet, Cowles et al () argue that while the ‘Europeanization’ of
regulation has produced distinctly European policies in their domestic
environments, member state idiosyncrasies have also shaped public
policies. Those with similar political structures as the EU have fewer
problems adapting to its policy direction (Cowles et al. ). In this
federal-like arrangement, relations between the two centres of authority
have not resulted in the latter completely losing their sovereignty
(Mamudu and Studlar ). Rather, when the EU supersedes the
domestic role in various policy sectors, it puts pressure on domestic
institutions to reassert their autonomy (Cowles et al. ).
Numerous studies have also characterized the UK as ‘quasi-federal’
(Horgan ; Bogdanor ; Laffin and Thomas ) even though its
structures are unusual. The UK shares many characteristics with federal
states: a combination of shared rule with territorial self-government, a
distribution of legal, executive and fiscal powers to allow devolved
territories a level of autonomy, an ‘umpire’ to rule in disputes between
levels of government and territorial representation at the central level (see
Watts ; McGarvey and Cairney ). Although the UK lacks a
 Asare, Cairney and Studlar
supreme constitution that is relatively immune from unilateral change
from the top, it can be classed as quasi-federal in a functional sense
because the UK government respects most decisions made in the
devolved territories (Horgan : ; Bogdanor : ; Cairney
). For present purposes, the focus is on behaviour, or the move-
ment towards ‘federal relationships’ (Watts ) rather than formal
structures.
This treatment of the EU and UK as federal-like allows us to compare
and predict their behaviour according to their respective levels of
horizontal fragmentation. The fragmentation of power in the EU is high.
Two independently-chosen legislative chambers, the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament, have policy authority, along with the
European Court of Justice and the central executive, the European
Commission (Schain and Menon ). At times the European Council
of chief executives of member states also becomes involved, at least
informally, in the policy process. The Commission also has limited
powers to monitor implementation compared to more established federal
systems such as the US. Based on this horizontal proliferation of
institutions, Kelemen (: ) predicts a form of regulatory federalism in
which ‘inflexible rulemaking and litigious enforcement’ characterizes
EU-member state relations. In contrast, the UK is a highly centralized
Westminster system, usually under one-party rule, with minimal roles for
the courts and parliament in policy-making and a strong asymmetry of
power in UK-devolved relationships. Therefore, we should expect
discretionary federalism to characterize state-devolved relations.
This may also extend to the role of the UK devolved governments in
EU policy making. Since the formation of the advisory Committee of the
Regions in , subcentral governments are recognized as legitimate
actors in the EU policy process, while the UK government encourages
‘cooperative regionalism’ (Bulmer et al. ): the UK and sub-central
governments try to depoliticize issues, working through bureaucratic
networks as much as possible rather than making them into visible
political conflicts requiring submission to another institution, such as a
judiciary, or allowing the public to become involved. This contrasts with
regulatory federalism, where institutional competition for public support
is the norm.
However, there are two problems with this framework. First,
Kelemen’s primary policy focus is environmental regulation, along with
food and drug safety. Although Kelemen treats these as representative of
all social regulation, a key tenet of policy analysis is variation by policy
issue (John : ). Further, environmental policy is often considered,
along with agriculture, to be among the most ‘Europeanized’ of policies
(Jordan ; Weale et al. ) and therefore a likely source of top-down
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control. In tobacco, the European Commission has struggled to establish
its role as the main policy initiator, in part because some member states
have challenged its authority, but also because tobacco regulation
involves a wide range of new and untested policy instruments. While the
Commission has taken control of some, member states such as the UK
have gone beyond its minimum requirements, and UK devolved terri-
tories have become a source of policy innovation.
Second, a comparison between the EU and UK may set up a false
distinction between levels of government by separating EU–member
state political processes from relationships formed within member states,
and by assuming that the direction of policy making flows from the top
down to the bottom. This precludes a degree of policy innovation from
and within the member states. It also highlights the broader problem in
IGR when its predictions are based on an analysis of formal authority.
The advantage of MLG is that the use of institutional frameworks to
predict behaviour becomes more of an empirical question. Decision-
making authority is dispersed and policy outcomes are determined by a
series of negotiations between various levels of government and interest
groups. The focus shifts from formal powers and the capacity to make and
enforce decisions to the level of government in which the decisions are
made.
Multi-level governance
MLG began as a means to address a false boundary between the study of
domestic and international politics, neither of which captured, ‘the
shifting and uncertain patterns of governance within which the EU is just
one actor upon a contested stage’ (Bache and Flinders : –). It
draws on the policy networks literature that stresses the role of interest
groups and the blurred boundaries between governmental and non-
governmental action. The blurring of formal and informal sources of
authority is extended to the roles of government actors at various levels,
with informal influence often more relevant than formal jurisdictions.
This may also extend, as with Kelemen, to the fragmented horizontal
power of central EU institutions: the more supra-state institutions such as
the European Parliament (EP), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and
the European Commission have demonstrated a high level of indepen-
dence in their decisions and are not dominated by the more state-centred
institutions, the Council of Ministers and the European Council (Hooghe
and Marks ; Marks and Hooghe ; George ; Bache and
Flinders )
However, the theoretical focus of MLG differs significantly from most
studies of federalism. It establishes the significance of three tiers of actors
 Asare, Cairney and Studlar
in decision making – supra-state, central state and sub-state – depending
on degrees of Europeanization, the strength of the regional policy
agenda, and the existing allocation of policy responsibilities entrenched
in the laws of member states (Marks ). Like neofunctionalism (Haas
), it contends that states and international organizations are caught in
a web of interdependence that allows supra-state organizations and
organized interests (which now includes sub-state authorities) to shape
both policy and integration. Furthermore, the flexibility of the framework
allows MLG processes to be explored empirically in two contrasting
ways: as a relatively stable set of relationships, with policy responsibility
allocated according to territory and overlaps between jurisdictions
minimized (Type ) or as a relatively complex and fluid process, with the
delegation of responsibility related to the nature of the policy rather than
territory (Type ) (Hooghe and Marks ). In either case, compared to
Kelemen’s framework, the focus is on the balance of authority among
multiple governmental levels rather than an ‘either-or’ struggle between
only two. There is no assumption about the ‘direction of travel’ or
restriction of the role of member states or sub-state authorities as
implementing bodies, subject to greater or lesser forms of control from
the centre. The value of this difference becomes clear when we consider
the innovative potential for the devolved territories in UK tobacco policy.
Tobacco control as a policy issue in the EU
The EU has taken steps to reduce tobacco consumption in member states
since  (Tables  and ). The competence of the EU in health matters
is limited, fragmented, and contested, but oriented toward the promotion
of public health through preventive measures (Guigner, ; Stru¨nck
). Directives and regulations to control tobacco consumption are
binding on member states. Directives have to be adopted into state laws
within a limited time period and permit adjustments to member states’
specific circumstances, while regulations have to be immediately adopted
by member states based on their original wording (Gilmore and McKee
: ). The EU can also recommend action when its powers are less
clearly demarcated or when there is not enough consensus to pass a
directive. The evidence suggests that the EU has used a mixture of
strategies to achieve change. Since  it has passed labelling directives
for package health warnings, limits on toxic ingredient yields, a ban on
broadcast, print, internet and sponsorship advertising, and a minimum
taxation level for cigarettes, in addition to several recommendations.
The directives were adopted initially because the EU wanted to curtail
the level of tobacco consumption in all member states (Gilmore and
McKee ). Most of the directives have been altered over the years to
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meet changing conditions. For example, in  the EU first required
health warnings to cover a minimum of four per cent of cigarette packs.
Now the size of health warnings has been extended to  per cent on the
front and  per cent on the back (European Commission ). More
recently, agreement has been reached on improved health warnings and
bans on certain descriptor terms such as ‘light and mild’. These
developments have been accompanied by recommendations on sales
restrictions, renewed discussions on tax harmonisation, and a more
focused agenda on second hand smoke (European Commission ).
The EU also began a media campaign against tobacco use in , while
agricultural production subsidies for tobacco (two per cent of the
Common Agricultural Policy) are to be phased out by . The EU
actively participated as an organization in the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC), where it acted to coordinate member state
T . Chronology of Tobacco Control in the EU


Tobacco growing subsidized in Common Agricultural Policy countries (CAP)
First attempts at harmonisation of cigarette taxes


First European anti-tobacco campaign announced (implemented )
Single European Act
 First EU health warnings; Television ad ban; Limits on product labelling; First EU
nonbinding resolution on tobacco control, second hand smoke
 First limits on toxic ingredients
 Tax harmonisation for cigarettes becomes renegotiated every few years
 Maastricht Treaty expands EU role in health, also emphasizes markets and subsidiarity;
EU-level tobacco industry became more organized
 First EU financing of NGO capacity-building projects
 First advisory body on tobacco control, BASP, ends, eventually replaced by ENSP
()
 First general EU statement on tobacco policy (others , )
 First EU general ad ban approved (TAD)
 Amsterdam Treaty, Article , ‘A high level of human health level protection shall be
assured in the definition and implementation of all Community policies and activities.’
EU recommended policies for member states
 ECJ strikes down TAD; Lisbon Process
 Larger health warnings: Bans on ‘light and mild’ descriptors
 EU sues tobacco companies for smuggling in the US: Council recommendation on
improving tobacco control


Revised EU print, telecast, and internet ad and sponsorship ban (TAD): Graphic
warning labels approved;
EU signs FCTC; ten new accession countries join EU
 Agricultural price support for tobacco reduced, to end by ;  Accession countries
given delays for acquis on tobacco tax; Ratification of FCTC
 Commission refers Germany to the ECJ for lack of advertising ban transposition;
Finnish Presidency emphasizes health in all policies, including tobacco
 Green Paper on second-hand smoke restrictions; Two new accession members; EU
mandates fire-safe cigarettes by 
 Asare, Cairney and Studlar
positions through both the Presidency and Commission (Mamudu and
Studlar ; European Commission ). Subsequently the EU, as well
as all but two of its member states, has ratified the FCTC. Such
developments have made the EU a leading international tobacco control
jurisdiction (Asare ) while providing a new institutional setting for
agencies and groups to struggle over policy (Princen ).
All five major EU institutions have been involved in tobacco policy in
important ways. Princen () argues that the European Commission
has been the major agenda-setter in tobacco control. Within the
Commission, however, there is a fragmentation of bureaucratic agencies
on tobacco policy. DG Sanco (Health) is usually the lead department for
tobacco control matters, but several others are involved to some degree,
depending on the issue. These include Agriculture, Economic and
Financial Affairs, Trade, Enterprise and Industry, Employment and
Social Affairs, Taxation and Customs Union, Consumer Affairs,
Accession, and Justice. In some cases the Commission may have to seek
compromise across departments to propose legislation (Guigner ),
particularly since the EU remains among the largest producers of
cigarettes in the world.
The Commission has engaged in frequent consultation with adminis-
trative and scientific experts in public health from member states in order
to improve its technocratic credentials (European Commission ;
Boyle ; Guigner ). However, the origin of the ‘Europe Against
Tobacco’ program that, along with the Single European Act, began the EU
effort in tobacco regulation, was the result of political entrepreneurship in
the European Council by President François Mitterand of France and
Premier Bettino Craxi of Italy.
There is input from member states both in the development of
legislation and in its implementation. Officially there is a bicameral
legislative process for tobacco control measures, with policy having to
pass through both the Council of Ministers (through Qualified Majority
Voting) and the European Parliament. Tobacco control was nearly a
compulsory topic at meetings of the Health Council of Ministers between
 and , being discussed in  of the  meetings (European
Commission : ). The Council of Ministers also passed resolutions
urging member states to take other actions limiting tobacco sales and
consumption since  (Princen and Rhinard ). The directly-
elected European Parliament has taken an active role in some legislation,
especially the first Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD) and the Tobacco
Products Directive (European Commission ).
Directives allow some flexibility in implementation and are subject to
negotiation with member-states through the comitology process, whereby
the Commission consults with representatives of member states
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(Bergström ). The court systems of member states also serve to
enforce EU law, with the ECJ as the court of last resort (Hix ). Some
member states, notably Germany, have challenged EU tobacco control
directives through appeals to the ECJ. Although the Court overturned
TAD, it has upheld other EU tobacco control measures.
Non-state entities have also become prominent. The growing authority
of the EU in tobacco control has led to a struggle among non-state actors
for influence. The tobacco industry and growers have long recognized
the policymaking authority of the EU in tobacco control and worked to
influence it through sympathetic states and front groups (European
Commission, ; Neuman et al. ). Since the late s the EU has
engaged in partnerships with civil society anti-tobacco groups, including
‘positive lobbying’ to finance new networks of advocacy groups promot-
ing tobacco regulation at the EU level as well as enhancing their
prospects for successful lobbying within their respective member states
(European Commission ; Mamudu and Studlar ). This pro-
motes a governance structure in which interest groups work together,
through formal and informal networks, and through member states to
influence EU policy.
While recognition of the EU as a federal system allows useful
comparisons with others, it does not suggest: (a) what the nature of policy
will be or (b) if detailed instructions to the member states will be followed,
particularly since the EU has relatively weak powers to ensure imple-
mentation. The evidence on tobacco policy suggests that the effect in
both cases is mixed. For example, in cases such as health warnings on
cigarette packs, institutions have cooperated to increase policy coverage.
In other cases such as tobacco advertising, the fragmentation of power
has resulted in compromise and minimal standards. The battle over the
ban on tobacco advertising in the EU culminated in the decision by the
ECJ in  to uphold a challenge by Germany and four tobacco
companies to the first ban. This was followed by more limited legislation
able to withstand judicial challenge. In  the EU adopted the second
version of the Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD), which banned inter-
national tobacco advertising, including sports sponsorship, in print
media, on radio and over the internet, but not indirect advertising, brand
stretching and advertising in non-EU media (Hervey ; Khanna ;
Duina and Kurzer ; Strünck ).
The evidence on implementation also is mixed. For example, the
agency only has a handful of staff with primary responsibilities in tobacco
control (interview, official, DG Sanco). Implementation is largely left
to officials in member states, with selective overview by the EU
Commission. Some countries, such as Germany and Austria, however,
may attract special scrutiny because of chronic implementation problems
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T . EU Tobacco Control Legislation and Recommendations
Name of Measure Key Requirements
Labelling directives , Require rotating health warnings on tobacco
products. Ban the marketing of certain tobacco
products for oral use
Advertising directives ,,, Ban all forms of TV advertising for tobacco
products. Ban on tobacco advertising in the
press, radio and on the Intern Ban on tobacco
sponsorship of events with cross-border effects
Tar Yield Directive  Sets a maximum tar yield of  mg per cigarette
by December ,  and of  mg per
cigarette from December , 
Tax directives , ,  Set minimum levels of excise duties on
cigarettes and tobacco
Tobacco Product Regulation Directive  Larger warning labels are required on all
tobacco products; descriptors suggesting that
one tobacco product is less harmful than
another are banned; manufacturers and
importers must submit a list of all ingredients
used in the manufacture of tobacco products.
Maximum levels of tar, nicotine and carbon
monoxide are established for cigarettes ( mg
tar per cigarette,  mg nicotine per cigarette,
 mg carbon monoxide per cigarette)
Workplace Air Quality directives ,  Require employers to ensure that workers have
access to fresh air and ventilation
Framework Directive on Health and Safety in
the Workplace 
Requires a health assessment to be carried out
by employees which should include exposure to
second-hand smoke in the workplace
Resolution on smoking in public places  Invites Member States to adopt measures
banning smoking in public places and on all
forms of public transportation (nonbinding)
Pregnant Women Directive  Requires employers to take action to protect
pregnant and breastfeeding women from
exposure to an exhaustive list of substances,
including carbon monoxide
Carcinogens Directive  Restricts smoking in workplace areas where
carcinogenic substances are handled
Council resolutions , ,  Proposals to Member States and the
Commission – measures to combat smoking
(nonbinding).
Council Recommendation  Concerns aspects of tobacco control that are
the responsibility of the Member States,
including: tobacco sales to children and
adolescents; tobacco advertising and promotion
that has no cross-border effects; provision of
information on advertising expenditure;
environmental effects of tobacco smoke
(nonbinding)
Source: European Commission ()
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(Cooper and Kurzer ). In some areas the levels of implementation
flexibility (or lax enforcement) contradict the idea of inflexible and
judicious enforcement associated with regulatory federalism. For
example, cigarette and tobacco prices still differ markedly (with the new
accession members in Central and Eastern Europe allowed transition
periods for tax harmonisation) and this has led to smuggling problems
(although the EU has pursued lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers for
complicity).
Therefore, the degree of effective EU authority is debatable. Some see
the EU as a weak tobacco control regime (Gilmore and McKee ;
Duina and Kurzer ; Strünck ). Yet others (Princen ;
Mamudu and Studlar ) consider it to be reasonably effective,
especially considering that it has limited authority and has only devel-
oped policies over the past two decades. Even after the major setback of
the ECJ decision overturning TAD, the EU executive and legislature
responded with TAD. Further, by , more than  per cent of
member states had adopted policies banning most forms of tobacco
advertising (European Commission ). Despite implementation prob-
lems, the EU Commission usually gets its way and enforces directives
through a process of notifications, warnings to states, and, as necessary,
references to the ECJ. The Commission took some states to the ECJ for
failing to comply with the directive.
Europeanization has had considerably more influence on policy
adoption in accession members lacking a substantial history and infra-
structure (Gilmore et al., ; Frisbee et al. ). The process of
‘unequal negotiation’ during the accession process enables the EU to
force applicant members to adopt tobacco control policies that harmo-
nise with those of existing EU members. However, overall, while the
EU’s authority has grown to the point of sharing sovereignty with
Member States (Mamudu and Studlar ), its authority is still limited
to specific competences, particularly under the doctrine of ‘subsidiarity’,
in place since the Maastricht Treaty of  (European Commission
), which pushes decisions to the lowest possible level of authority.
The EU has successfully politicized the tobacco control issue to enable it
to take action on behalf of its members in a trans-European manner, but
such authority is still limited, fragmented, and contested, in both
policymaking and implementation (Guigner ).
Tobacco control in the UK
The EU’s imposition of policy on reluctant countries such as Germany
shows the effect of regulatory federalism in member states. However, its
effect in the UK is less certain because many of the most important
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advances in EU policy were welcomed in the UK at the time of their
implementation. For example, although the UK’s Conservative Govern-
ment (–) opposed most interventionist tobacco control measures
and voted against TAD, its successor Labour Government introduced
legislation (in ) that went beyond the requirements of TAD (Duina
and Kurzer, ; Cairney a). Similarly, the EU directive on tax
levels followed a long history of tax rises in the UK, and the principle of
health warnings on cigarette packs was established in the UK before the
first directive (see Table ). Further, while the UK government’s
development of smoking bans in public places was tardy compared to the
devolved territories (below), it introduced legislation before any EU
requirement.
Developments under the Labour Government led the UK to high
rankings in comparative expert surveys of tobacco control in Europe. In
the latest survey (Joossens and Raw ), the UK is in a league by itself,
scoring  out of a possible  points, based on measures identified by
the World Health Organization (price of tobacco, smoking bans, adver-
tising bans, health education, health warnings, treatment). Overall, the
UK has moved from being a laggard to a leader.
Before the  Labour Government, tobacco policy in the UK was
shaped by three forces: () voluntary agreements between the govern-
ment and the tobacco industry on regulations; () cigarette sales as a
source of tax revenue; () few government policies other than bans on
broadcast advertising and educational campaigns against smoking
(which commanded far less expenditure than tobacco company adver-
tising) (Baggott ; Read ; Berridge ; Cairney a; b;
Leichter ). The voluntary agreements largely required the industry
to regulate itself, while the UK government opposed tobacco control
measures that curtailed individual freedoms, in contrast to countries
such as France and Italy with more established histories of public
health interventions (Duina and Kurzer : ). This approach was
reflected in its behaviour in the EU Council of Ministers (European
Commission ).
Overall, British tobacco policy was considered relatively weak in
comparison to some Nordic countries and others such as Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. The most prevalent explanation for this was
the dominant influence of the domestic tobacco industry within govern-
ment, based on the British preference for cooperative regulatory rela-
tionships (voluntary agreements) and the strong socio-economic position
of tobacco companies. Smoking prevalence was relatively high and the
industry supported over , jobs, raised the equivalent of £ billion
per year in tax revenue, and provided a significant source of export
revenue (Cairney a: ). This cemented its strong position within key
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T . Chronology of Tobacco Control in the United Kingdom
 First age limit on sales to minors
 First large-scale epidemiological study of the relationship between smoking and lung
cancer Doll and Hill in the British Medical Journal
 Health Minister: Revenue from tobacco makes discouraging smoking difficult
 First government-funded anti-smoking education initiatives
 British Medical Research Council: smoking-cancer link
 Royal College of Physicians (RCP) report, ‘Smoking and Health’
 The US Surgeon General report on ‘Smoking and Health’. Banning of cigarette
advertising on television
 Minister of Health notification: government legislation forthcoming to control cigarette
smoking
 First of voluntary agreement with the tobacco industry; first health warnings. Founding
of ASH (Action on Smoking and Health), anti-smoking group funded by the state
 Announcement that an independent executive committee for guidelines and testing of
cigarette contents
 Health Education Authority (HEA) anti-smoking campaign aimed at young people.
 The Government announces a new voluntary agreement with the tobacco industry.
First rotating health warnings, four new ones
 Cigarette tax increases by largest percentage price rise since 
 British Medical Association (BMA) becomes more active on smoking issues
 New voluntary agreement with greater restrictions on advertising
 Government ban on oral snuff products comes into force
 Government intention to legislate for tougher new health warnings, in line with
European Community directive requirements. Green Paper, The Health of the Nation
 Government Action Plan to reduce smoking with five goals: price, increasing awareness
of health risks and providing support for smokers who want to give up, effective
controls on advertising, protecting smokers from passive smoking, and improving
scientific understanding of the risks of tobacco
 Labour manifesto promise to ban tobacco advertising. Labour government announces it
would take action on cigarette smoking. First Minister for Public Health appointed
/ White Paper, Smoking Kills; Government-subsidized cessation services begin. Higher
taxes, anti-smuggling enforcement improved; Scientific Committee on Tobacco and
Health official government report on dangers of second-hand smoke; New voluntary
code on non-smoking indoors
 Introduction of Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Bill to ban advertising 
Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act passed, implemented 
 National Assembly for Wales requests legislative power on second-hand smoke
 Wanless Report, Securing Good Health for the Whole Population; White Paper,
Choosing Health; Scottish Executive proposes indoor smoking ban, after a Private
Member’s bill
 Scottish Parliament passes the Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act for ban
in workplaces and public places, implemented in March . Labour election
manifesto promises partial smoking ban. Northern Ireland Minister announces in
October smoking ban in workplaces for April , 
 House of Commons votes to introduce indoor non-smoking ban in England,
implemented July , ; also allows National Assembly for Wales authority to make
decision for Wales. Wales bans smoking indoors on April , 
Source: Berridge (), Cairney (a, b), Asare (), ASH-UK www.ash.org
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government departments, the Treasury and Department of Trade and
Industry, while public health interests were marginalized to the less
influential Department of Health (Baggott ; Read , Leichter
; Berridge ).
However, the advent of the Labour Government in  eventually
led to the demise of voluntary agreements for regulation (Asare ).
The first Labour party manifesto pledged stricter regulations on
tobacco consumption (Cm , ). This government was more
committed to interventionist tobacco control as a key driver in public
health policy, and its new approach accelerated the decline of tobacco
company influence within government, particularly since public atti-
tudes to smoking were changing, prevalence was relatively low, and the
economic contribution of tobacco was diminishing (Cairney a: ).
See Table .
Two government white papers, Smoking Kills () and Choosing Health
(), guide recent tobacco policy. In both documents, the government
outlined four major policies to reduce smoking prevalence: () a compre-
hensive ban on tobacco advertising; () increased tax on tobacco
products; () limiting smoking in public places and workplaces; and ()
providing publicly funded Nicotine Replacing Therapy services (NRT).
Policies were also adopted to prevent children under  years of age and
pregnant women from smoking (Cm , ).
To control tobacco advertising, the government went beyond EU
requirements by effectively implementing TAD. The Tobacco Advertising
and Promotion Act  ended almost all forms of tobacco advertising in the
UK, including over the internet, by  (Cm , ; Berridge ;
Asare ). Although its slow pace of legislation rankled public health
advocates and prompted a Scottish Parliament attempt to introduce its
own legislation (Cairney a: ), the legislation passed before TAD
was adopted in the EU. The Labour Government also went beyond EU
requirements in most areas, including a five per cent annual increase in
tobacco products in real terms to discourage smoking and tasking the
NHS with providing free NRT to the poor.
The exception to this new direction was the UK’s attitude to smoking
in public places. Although the government accepted the scientific
evidence on passive smoking in , it chose to address the issue with
voluntary measures (Cairney a: ). For workplaces, a government
agency (the Health and Safety Commission) produced an Approved
Code of Practice on smoking in . A special case was made for bars
and restaurants. The voluntary code with the leisure industry required
only that business introduced ventilation systems or put a sticker in their
window saying that smoking was allowed (Cairney a: ). Most
policy innovation in the UK came from its devolved territories.
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Devolved government and tobacco control in the UK
From , tobacco control shifted from being solely a responsibility of
central government to one in which power is shared with devolved
jurisdictions. This extends to various aspects of health policy (such as
NRT) and health education. However, the most significant developments
took place around the issue of smoking in public places, since policy
innovation in the rest of the UK was a factor in the UK government’s
decision to introduce a comprehensive ban. Scotland took the lead by
legislating in  and Wales and Northern Ireland both signalled a
desire to follow its lead before a decision was made at Westminster in
February .
A variety of reasons have been used to explain the decision of devolved
governments to go their own way. For example, each jurisdiction focused
more strongly on the issue of public health, in part because the health of
their territorial populations was relatively poor (Greer ; Asare ).
In each case, while broader public health plans featured action on
exercise, eating, and alcohol consumption, tobacco control was the main
plank (see Scottish Executive ; DHSSPS ). Second, each
devolved territory was influenced heavily by the decision in Ireland to
introduce a comprehensive ban quickly, while England was more likely to
seek lessons from larger countries, such as the US, which introduced
change incrementally (Cairney ). Third, in Scotland and Wales, the
differences were influenced by venue shift and the ability of public health
interests to influence new political actors (Cairney b; ). How-
ever, for present purposes it is more important to explore the scope for this
new direction. In tobacco-related health policy and health education, it
is relatively easy to demonstrate discretionary federalism, since UK
government involvement tends to be as part of professional networks
sharing best practice. The nature of UK and devolved relationships is less
clear with smoking bans. At face value, there are signs of regulatory
federalism in each country: in Northern Ireland the suspension of
devolution led to a UK minister taking the decisions; in Wales policy
innovation was constrained by the inability to secure legislative space in
Westminster; and in Scotland the UK Health Secretary, John Reid,
sought to block policy innovation through First Minister Jack McConnell
(Cairney ; a).
However, in each case this picture is misleading. In Northern Ireland,
the link between political turmoil and general inattention to public policy
better explains the delays in policy innovation (Greer ). Further,
health minister Shaun Woodward’s decision to introduce a comprehen-
sive ban was made separately from the UK policy process, with Prime
Minister Tony Blair unaware of the decision until after it was made
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(Cairney ). In Wales, the lack of legislative powers that the National
Assembly for Wales (NAW) required to innovate stemmed more from an
unconvincing demand for devolution (Johnson ) than a desire of the
UK government to manage specific issues. As soon as Westminster passed
the Health Act , the NAW was free to take its own decision, regardless
of the decision made for England (Cairney ). Further, the NAW’s
original decision (in ) to ban smoking in only some public places was
very similar to the approach outlined by the UK Government in the
White Paper Choosing Health (Cm , ).
Similarly, in Scotland, early policy decisions did not diverge signifi-
cantly from the UK line. In May , the Scottish Executive (now
Scottish Government) introduced a voluntary agreement with the hospi-
tality industry. The Scottish Voluntary Charter merely required that
pubs and restaurants provide designated smoke-free places in their
facilities. Although the Executive hinted that legislation would be
adopted if the agreement failed to produce favourable results, the low
rate of compliance (ASH Scotland ; Asare ) was followed in
 by a reinforced commitment to voluntary measures (Scottish
Executive ). When the Executive finally decided to legislate, UK
opposition was limited to the personal beliefs held by John Reid. The
Department of Health was far more supportive. Indeed, it helped find a
solution to uncertainty regarding Scotland’s powers to legislate, on public
health grounds, in an area previously considered to be a centrally
reserved health and safety issue (Cairney b; ). In this light,
there is significant evidence of discretionary federalism.
Yet, the experience of smoking bans since devolution still stretches
Kelemen’s focus to the limits, since we are really witnessing policy
innovation in the devolved territories rather than the discretion to
implement central policy in a distinctive way. The MLG focus on
multi-directional rather than linear sources of policy formulation seems
more appropriate, particularly since policy change in the rest of the UK
influenced UK government policy. The value of a focus on governance
is reinforced when we consider the ‘campaigning clientelism’ role of the
UK’s Department of Health. As well as funding groups such as Action on
Smoking and Health (ASH) to raise issues and criticize policy when it
could not, the Department made key contributions to the development of
legislation in at least one devolved territory (Cairney b). This action
highlights a complex process of multi-level governance: the influence of
devolved policies on the English agenda is furthered by parts of the
central UK government (Cairney ).
Tobacco also provides a problem for the comparison of EU and UK
regulatory regimes. In other policy areas, there are clear links from the
top (EU) to the bottom. For example, most devolved environmental
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policy is Europeanized, and the devolved territories may be charged with
the implementation of directives, monitored by the UK government as
the member state. Similarly, in agriculture the coordination of devolved
government policy by the UK government is significant, allowing us to
compare its conduct with the EU in very similar policy terrain (see
Keating ; McGarvey and Cairney ). While the EU’s reach into
health policy has become increasingly significant, this relates more to
areas such as working conditions, patient rights, and private health
insurance than public health and health education (Greer ).
In tobacco, the legislative reach of the EU rarely extends to the
responsibilities of the devolved territories. For example, before the
smoking ban legislation in , Scotland’s role was limited to issues such
as health education, NRT, smoking cessation clinics, and the enforce-
ment of age-related restrictions, with taxation, labelling and tar yield
reserved to the UK. In these specific devolved issues, although we can
confirm discretionary federalism in the UK, we cannot demonstrate
regulatory federalism in the EU. Since EU competence in tobacco policy
thus far has been based on harmonizing policies for fair competition in
the single market rather than public health directives per se (Khanna
), its role is often one of coordinating, complementing, and support-
ing public health efforts. Therefore, the EU’s role (to date) on passive
smoking has largely been supportive, suggesting discretionary federalism
in some areas of tobacco control.
Conclusions
Over the past two decades the UK government’s monopoly on all
tobacco policy has been replaced by shared control among three levels of
government. The central state now shares authority with the EU for
policies on taxation, health warnings, advertising and tobacco contents.
It has also devolved responsibility on health education, smoking cessation
strategies, and indoor non-smoking regulation to Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland. This article presents two main ways to examine the
effects of such developments: () an application of Kelemen’s theory of
federalism to highlight the value of treating the EU and UK as
quasi-federations, and () multi-level governance, which examines shift-
ing jurisdictional boundaries and the blurred lines between formal and
informal sources of influence.
The findings from tobacco control provide mixed support for
Kelemen’s () thesis. The growth of EU-determined policies, along
with public disputes among central institutions and judicial appeals over
interpretation of statutes, suggests regulatory federalism. While decisions
made at the EU level are left to individual countries to implement, the
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European Commission and the ECJ exercise considerable executive
oversight and judicial powers. In contrast, discretionary federalism is the
norm within the UK. This is consistent with Kelemen’s argument that
the executive in a centralized parliamentary system is less concerned with
making sure that details of policy are followed across lower level
jurisdictions. In most aspects of tobacco policy, the UK government
respects the devolution settlement, with intervention largely restricted to
professional networks and best practice.
However, tobacco policy qualifies Kelemen’s thesis in a number of
ways. First, there is a difference between the existence of a separation of
powers and the practice of regulatory federalism. There is considerable
debate about the influence the EU has on member state implementation.
Implementation success, measured in terms of an acceptable level of
member state uniformity, takes time to materialize. Second, there is
considerable variation in implementation, depending on the existing level
of policy development in each member state. There is considerable
flexibility in implementation through the complex process of comitology
between member states and the EU Commission, a process Kelemen
does not discuss. Through comitology the states, especially through
‘national experts’, have a role in developing the guidelines for policy
implementation (Blom-Hansen ). Once these are agreed, all member
states are supposed to abide by them. Thus the separation of powers at
the EU central level does not preclude negotiations about implementa-
tion and is not entirely reliant on the relatively inflexible and ‘judicialised’
approach to implementation that regulatory federalism indicates. As Hix
() describes, some comitology procedures are based more on a
separation of powers, others on a fusion of power. Third, unlike
Germany, which is increasingly subject to EU imposition on tobacco
policy, the UK shows that the authoritative role of the EU is relatively
insignificant when a member state’s policies have gone beyond EU
requirements in both tempo and content. In effect, evaluations of
discretionary or regulatory federalism will depend significantly on the
level of policy maturity in the EU compared to member states. The EU
has least authority over member states with the most restrictive tobacco
control policies. While ostensibly it has more authority over laggard and
accession states, laggards have the capacity to resist, as do accession states
once they become full members.
In environmental policy, Kelemen’s main object of study for regulat-
ory federalism, the authority of the EU, while slow to develop, has been
established for longer and perhaps with less controversy than in tobacco
control. In many areas of tobacco policy, the EU is still finding a role and
there is more evidence of discretionary federalism, particularly when the
authority of the EU remains in considerable doubt. In other words, the
Federalism and Multilevel Governance in Tobacco Policy 
EU may be a regulatory state but, in tobacco policy, regulation often
accounts for a small proportion of public policy.
Fourth, the evidence from other policy areas (particularly when they
have a strong finance or social security component) suggests that the UK
government does not always display discretionary federalism (McGarvey
and Cairney, ; Keating, ; Cairney, Keating and Hepburn,
). Finally, since policy innovation from the UK central state and its
devolved territories is a key feature in tobacco control, this takes us some
distance from Kelemen’s focus on the EU to explain policy development.
In such cases, the MLG focus on shifting jurisdictional boundaries and
uncertain formal influence is better equipped to explore the role of policy
innovation in devolved territories that influences policy development in
the UK and EU.
Based on this study, the effect of EU social regulation appears to vary
by policy issue and country. For example, the UK displays more
decentralization in tobacco than on environmental issues. While
Germany may be becoming more centralized on the environment,
despite its internal federal system, on tobacco control it has continued to
respect a division between central and provincial authority. Even with
increased informal pressure from the EU to pass stronger second-hand
smoke laws, this issue has been left to the provinces (Gru¨ning et al ).
Thus it would seem that not all social regulation is equal.
While the pattern of competitive involvement of horizontally-
fragmented EU institutions in tobacco policy formation is broadly
congruent with Kelemen’s () concept of regulatory federalism,
Guigner () is correct that policymaking on tobacco issues involves
limited and sometime grudging responsibility for EU institutions.
Regulatory federalism has the advantage of parsimony, but one of the
problems of theorizing federalism has been the differences in policy
authority in such systems worldwide. The EU, as a level of suprastate
authority, is unlikely to behave like state-centred federal systems for all
policy areas. The very design of the EU gives it different amounts of
competence in various policies.
Tobacco policy is one in which EU policy competence has been slow
to develop, has been contested, and, while considerably greater than it
was  years ago, is still only partial, with states and sometimes their
subdivisions retaining considerable power. The regulatory federalism
of separate EU institutions aids understanding of some dimensions of
tobacco policy, but the governance of this policy area is shared between
both formal and informal institutions, as well as among levels. Therefore
our research finds that, overall, MLG provides a superior framework to
describe EU tobacco policy. MLG is more able to reflect the complexity
and variation of EU regulatory policies and the contingencies of both
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policy formation and implementation. Yet, this statement arguably
suggests the need for more research into different policy sectors and
institutions. Since MLG is such a flexible concept it is able to accom-
modate a wide range of behaviour. However, its flexibility makes it
difficult to explain that behaviour more generally. Part of the explanation
for MLG ambiguity is the nature of its object of study – a relatively fluid
and often indeterminate process, with levels of power diffusion varying
across time and policy issues, requiring a relatively flexible theoretical
framework to accommodate empirical studies. In effect, the choice of
MLG over Keleman’s version of federalism suggests drawing conclusions
on an empirical, case-by-case basis rather than embracing, perhaps
prematurely, a deductive, general theory of federalism in the EU.
NOTES
. Britain still voted against the second version of the TAD in , ostensibly to delay its applicability
to Formula One international racing events (Duina and Kurzer ).
. Note that in the EU the reverse is true. The Commission must frame its directive on health and
safety, not public health, grounds.
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